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I. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010: INTRODUCTION AND
OVERVIEW
President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
into law in March 2010 (together, the "Affordable Care Act," the
"ACA," the "Act,"1 or pejoratively-as referred to by its Republican
opponents--"Obamacare").2  The objective was comprehensive
health care reform--"to make health insurance affordable for mil-
lions of Americans and to protect them from potentially cata-
strophic medical expenses."' Toward that end, the Act aimed to
curb rising health care costs and to provide greater coverage to the
more than forty-five million Americans who were uninsured in
2009.' Currently health care costs and health insurance pre-
miums are spiraling out of control and the number of Americans
without health insurance continues to rise. As an approximate
number, fifty million people are uninsured.5 The Center for Dis-
ease Control reported that an estimated 59.1 million persons had
no health insurance for at least part of the first quarter of 2010,
up from 56.4 million in the year 2008 and 58.7 million in 2009.6
Congress found that sixty-two percent of all personal bankruptcies
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended
by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
2. Jonathan Oberlander, Beyond Repeal-The Future of Health Care Reform, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2277, 2277-79 (2010).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENDING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/healthcare/.
4. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH INSURANCE
PROPOSALS (2008), available at httpJ/www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xxydoc9924/12-18-
KeyIssues.pdf.
5. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d.
1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nora. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (citing CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009 23 tbl.8 (2010), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf).
6. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vital Signs: Health Insurance Cover-
age and Health Care Utilization-United States, 2006-2009 and January-March 2010, 59




in this country were caused in part by medical expenses.7 Regard-
less of which statistics one remembers, the need for health care
reform in American public policy cannot be disputed.8 The Act has
been described as "the largest social reform effort undertaken
since Medicare," and "a massive incremental reform-but not an
uprooting-of the nation's health care system."
The ACA is a comprehensive statute designed to increase access
to the United States' health care market for every citizen, reduce
health care costs, and enable and increase health insurance pro-
tection for those currently uninsured or underinsured.' ° It is 975
pages in length as published in the Public Laws" and comprises
nine titles (plus a tenth title consisting of amendments to the pre-
ceding titles I-IX)." Among its numerous reforms, the Act re-
quires insurers to enroll every person or employer who applies for
individual or group coverage. 3 It creates state-operated health
benefit exchanges that will enable individuals and small business-
es to leverage their collective buying power to make health insur-
ance available at competitive prices.'4 Eligibility for Medicaid cov-
erage is expanded for the lowest income populations-individuals
at or below 133% of the poverty level.'5 There is a guaranteed is-
sue requirement that prohibits insurance companies from denying
coverage to applicants with pre-existing medical conditions, and a
community-rating requirement that prevents insurers from charg-
ing increased premiums to individuals with pre-existing ill-
nesses.1 6  Insurers can no longer limit the amount of coverage
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10106(a)(2)(G),
124 Stat. 119, 907 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2010)).
8. Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia's Response to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 37, 37-38 (2010).
9. David Bacon et al., Bacon on Constitutionality of Health Care Reform Legislation,
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, March 21, 2011, at 1, available at LexisNexis, 2011 Emerging
Issues 5557.
10. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
11. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1241 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)).
12. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1248-49.
13. Id. at 1251 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-l(a) (2010)). This is the guaranteed issue
requirement, which is effective on January 1, 2014. Id.
14. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§
1311, 1321); 42 U.S.C. §§ 18031, 18041.
15. Id. (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001); 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a).
16. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-l(a), 300gg-3(a)).
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available, and insurers are prohibited from cancelling coverage
when the insured individual gets sick.'7 Additionally, children
covered as dependents under their parents' policies are eligible to
continue that coverage until age twenty-six. 8 The ACA requires
large employers to offer health insurance to their employees 9 and
offers tax incentives to small businesses that buy health coverage
for their workers.2 °
The Act also expands federal programs that help the poor obtain
health coverage. For eligible individuals who buy their health
coverage through exchanges, the Act offers tax credits for payment
of premiums2" and provides federal subsidies to help alleviate their
out-of-pocket costs.22 All Medicare co-payments and co-insurance
fees are cancelled for multiple preventive services, including
screening tests for colon, breast, and cervical cancer.2"
The linchpin of the Act (and the core of the controversy) is the
individual mandate. ACA section 1501(b) requires that all appli-
cable individuals and their dependents maintain minimum essen-
tial coverage starting in 2014.24 Those who fail to obtain the min-
imum coverage must include a "shared responsibility" payment
along with their annual federal income tax return.2' The shared
responsibility payment is a fixed dollar amount penalty, and for
individuals who cannot afford the coverage, the amount is reduced
based on household income.26 That payment is specifically labeled
as a penalty under the statute and not a tax." An applicable indi-
vidual is a person who does not fit under one of several enume-
rated statutory exclusions, among which are those who qualify for
certain religious exemptions, non-U.S. citizens or illegal aliens,
17. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§
1001, 1201); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-4, 300gg-12.
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001(a)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14.
19. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §
1511); 29 U.S.C. § 218a (2010).
20. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 534 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2010)); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1421.
21. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1401(a).
22. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18071); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1402.
23. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §
4104); 42 U.S.C. § 13951(b).
24. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 534 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act § 1501(b)); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
25. Id. at 535 (citing Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b)); 26 U.S.C. §
500OA(b), (c).
26. 26 U.S.C. § 500OA(c), (e)(1)-(5).
27. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 535 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 500OA(b), (c)); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b).
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incarcerated individuals, members of Indian tribes, and those who
cannot afford to pay the required contributions for the minimum
essential coverage.2" In summary, beginning in 2014, ACA §
1501(b)29 mandates that every individual obtain health insurance
or pay a penalty, and further, that every individual must purchase
his coverage in the private market." The ACA was designed to
preserve and build upon the existing free market.
The individual mandate is the foundation of Congress' compre-
hensive effort to reduce health care costs. Congress found that the
individual mandate, together with the other provisions of the Act,
would add millions of new consumers to the health insurance
market and thereby increase the supply and demand for health
care services. This would, in turn, increase the numbers and per-
centages of Americans with health insurance.3' This is important,
because Congress found that the cost of providing uncompensated
care to the uninsured was forty-three billion dollars in 2008. 2 To
make up for this loss, health care providers pass these costs on to
private insurers, and private insurers, in turn, pass these costs on
to America's families in the form of increased premiums, averag-
ing over $1000 per year. 3 If there were no individual mandate,
many individuals would not buy health insurance until they
needed care (akin to individuals shopping for fire insurance after
the blaze ignites). By significantly increasing the insured popula-
tion, the individual mandate and the other provisions of the act
would minimize this "adverse selection"34 and enlarge the health
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(b); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)-(e).
29. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
30. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(a); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D)
(2010). A government option had been considered to compete with the private market, but
the public option was dropped. Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Ob-
vious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, *4 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html. Congress decided that health insur-
ance would be best provided by the private sector. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(C).
32. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(F).
33. Id.
34. Adverse selection refers to:
[T]he tendency of people to avoid the purchase of insurance unless they expect to
need it, and the tendency of those with greater need to buy more insurance. A health
insurance market could never survive or even form if people could wait to buy insur-
ance until they are on the way to the hospital.
Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Insurance
Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 457, 463 (2011). Insurers rely on the practice of medical under-
writing:
[Wihich consists of evaluating the health risks specific to each subscriber in order to
decide the terms of coverage and assign an actuarially fair price .... [Mledical un-
Spring 2012
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insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals. Congress found
that this would lower health insurance premiums for all eligible
Americans. The individual mandate is thus essential to creating
effective health insurance markets where improved, guaranteed-
issue insurance products would be sold without exclusions for pre-
existing conditions.35
Finally, Congress found that administrative costs for private
health insurance amounted to ninety billion dollars in 2006 and
accounted for between 26% and 30% of premiums in the individual
and small group markets. By significantly increasing health in-
surance coverage and the size of the purchasing pools, the indi-
vidual mandate and the other provisions would result in signifi-
cantly reduced administrative costs and enable further reductions
in premiums.3' The individual mandate, then, is the keystone or
foundation provision on which the total reform package rests.
Without the mandate and the resulting reduction in health insur-
ance premiums, the other reforms would not be financially viable,
and the comprehensive plan for the federal regulation of the
health insurance market would be undercut.38
Congress framed the main thrust of the ensuing constitutional
battles when it found that the individual mandate is commercial
and economic in nature and substantially affects interstate com-
merce.39 Congress cited several facts in support of that premise.
First of all, Congress found that the individual mandate regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature; specifically,
"economic . . .decisions about how and when health care is paid
for, and when health care is purchased."' Secondly, Congress
found that "[hlealth insurance and health care are a significant
part of the national economy,"' and that health insurance "pays
for medical equipment, medical supplies, and drugs that are
derwriting rewards people who purchase while they are still young and healthy, and
excludes pre-existing conditions or charges higher rates for those who are not.
Id.
35. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10106; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(J).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(H). "[Tihe Federal government has a significant role in regulating
health insurance. The [minimum essential coverage] requirement is an essential part of
this larger regulation of economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would un-
dercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market." Id.
39. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501(a)(1)-(2); 42 U.S.C. §
18091(a)(2)(A)-(J).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(1), (a)(2)(A).
41. Id. § 18091(a)(2)(B).
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shipped in interstate commerce.' ' Furthermore, because "[m]ost
health insurance products are sold by national or regional insur-
ers, ' health insurance is sold in interstate commerce, and insur-
ance payouts travel through interstate commerce." Predictably,
then, the primary focus of the subsequent court challenges would
be the Commerce Clause45 and the Necessary and Proper Clause,"
and whether the ACA exceeds Congress' powers under these cor-
nerstone doctrines.
Within minutes after the signing of the ACA the first constitu-
tional challenge was filed in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Depart-
ment of Health & Human Services." This case was brought by-
among others-the Attorney Generals and/or Governors of twenty-
six states. 8 Since that time (March 2011), no less than twenty-
seven cases have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the
ACA, primarily targeting the individual mandate. 49 A number of
these cases were dismissed on procedural grounds such as stand-
ing and ripeness. ° At the time of this writing, six cases have been
decided at the federal district court level. Three decisions have
held that the ACA and the individual mandate are constitutional:




45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power... to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian Tribes."
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18. 'The Congress shall have power.., to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof." Id.
47. 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Flor-
ida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct.
604 (2011).
48. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. The states are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mich-
igan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 1263 n. 1.
49. Elizabeth L. Bondurant & Steven D. Henry, Constitutional Challenges to the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 249, 250 (2011).
50. Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 139,
142 n.17 (2011) (citing, inter alia, New Jersey Physicians Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d
502 (D.N.J. 2010), aff-d, 653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011); Baldwin v. Sibelius, No. 1033, 2010
WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010), affd, 654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011); Taitz v. Obama,
707 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)).
51. 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
417
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mas More Law Center. v. Obama. Three decisions have struck
down the individual mandate as unconstitutional: Florida ex rel.51• 55
Bondi,54 Virginia. ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sibelius, and Goudy-
Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.56 Li-
berty University and Cuccinelli were appealed to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, but both of these cases were vacated and
dismissed on procedural grounds in September 2011.17  Thomas
More Law Center was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and the constitutionality of the ACA-including the indi-
vidual mandate-was affirmed on June 29, 2011.58 Florida ex rel.
Bondi was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
was affirmed on August 12, 2011, upholding the decision below
and ruling the individual mandate unconstitutional. 9 Mead v.
Holder was appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals under
the changed name, Seven Sky v. Holder, and the court upheld the
ACA on November 8, 2011.60 In summary, at the time of this writ-
ing, two circuit courts have upheld the individual mandate and
one has struck it down.61 On Nov 14, 2011, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
52. 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 635, 649 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal,
No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
53. 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010), affd, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
54. 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1306 (2011), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida
ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct.
604 (2011).
55. 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
56. 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089, 1111 (M.D. Pa. 2011).
57. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli was vacated and remanded for dismissal, because the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that Virginia lacked standing to challenge the
individual mandate. 656 F.3d at 272-73. The mandate applied "not to states but exclusive-
ly to individuals." Id. at 272. Liberty University was vacated and remanded for dismissal
on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear pre-enforcement challenges to the
individual mandate-specifically, to the shared responsibility penalty payment collected by
the Internal Revenue Service from applicable, non-exempt individuals who fail to maintain
the individual coverage requirement. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 at *56-57; see 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A (a)-(f). The court held that this penalty was a tax; therefore, the suit was barred
under the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7241(a). 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 at *20-25,
*56-57.
58. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
59. 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
60. 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
61. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 549 (upholding the individual mandate); Seven-
Sky, 661 F.3d at 5, 20 (upholding the individual mandate); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen.,
648 F.3d at 1328 (invalidating the individual mandate), cert. granted in part sub nom.
Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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case, Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services.62
In many of these cases, several causes of action were pleaded in
addition to the Commerce Clause challenges.63 In all of these cas-
es, however, the primary target was § 1501 (26 U.S.C. § 5000A):
the individual mandate. The question presented has been crystal
clear: [i]s the minimum coverage provision of the ACA constitu-
tional and consistent with the Commerce Clause? This comment
will focus on whether Congress-consistent with its Commerce
Clause power-can require all applicable Americans to buy health
insurance in the private market. The relevant and modern Su-
preme Court precedent will be reviewed, along with the constitu-
tional arguments for and against the mandate.
Pointedly, however, the entirety of research findings and dis-
cussion to follow may soon be moot, because the controversy has
now reached the Supreme Court.64 As noted above, the Court
granted the petition for a writ of certiorari on November 14, 2011
to hear the government's appeal from the decision of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services.65 Oral arguments are
expected to take place in March 2012, and the Court is expected to
rule by the end of the current term. If the Court adheres to
precedent rather than "naked politics," and if the Court interprets
the Commerce Clause67 and the Necessary and Proper Clause" as
62. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
63. An incomplete list of some of the other counts pleaded in these cases include:
(1) The ACA violates the Taxing and Spending Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. See,
e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1266-70 (2011), afJ'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen.
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in
part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
(2) The ACA violates the Tenth Amendment because it infringes on state sovereignty and
commandeers state lawmaking functions and police powers. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636-37 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismis-
sal, No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sep. 8, 2011).
64. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
65. Id.
66. James Vicini, Supreme Court to Take on Obama Healthcare Law, REUTERS, Nov.
14, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/14Ius-usa-healthcare-court-
idUSTRE7AD1AK20111114.
67. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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it has in the past, the Affordable Care Act should be upheld as a
valid exercise of Congressional power.69
Unfortunately, politics may play a decisive role in the ultimate
outcome. The passage of the ACA was not a bipartisan effort; the
votes of the House and Senate went almost entirely along party
lines."0 The three federal district judges who upheld the individual
mandate in their decisions were Democratic appointees, and the
three federal district judges who ruled against the mandate were
appointed by Republicans.7 Notably, however, the recent ruling of
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomas More Law Center v.
69. E-mail from Martin H. Redish, Louis and Harriet Ansel Professor of Law and Pub.
Policy, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law to author (June 5, 2011, 9:43 PM EDT) (on file with
author).
70. Bondurant & Henry, supra note 49, at 249. The passage of the ACA into law was
almost a totally partisan event. Id. The ACA "passed the Senate on December 24, 2009 by
a vote of 60-39 with all Democrats and Independents voting for it and all Republicans vot-
ing against it." Id. The Act "passed the House of Representatives on March 21, 2010, by a
vote of 219-212, with all 178 Republicans and 32 Democrats voting against it." Id. at 249-
50.
71. The federal district judges who upheld the constitutionality of the ACA in Mead v.
Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 43 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2011)., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 635, 649 (W.D. Va.
2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th
Cir. Sept. 8, 2011)., and Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D.
Mich. 2010), affd, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011)-Judges Kessler, Moon, and Steeh, respec-
tively-were appointed by President Bill Clinton. Kessler, Gladys, Biographical Directory of
Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1270&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Moon, Norman K., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.jc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2743&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Steeh, George Caram III, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://www.jc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=2771&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited Dec. 22, 2011). The district judge who ruled against the ACA in Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for
dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) was Judge Henry Hudson, appointed by President
George W. Bush. Hudson, Henry E., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://www.fc.gov/servletlnGetInfo?jid=2954&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited Dec. 22, 2011). The judge who struck down the ACA in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1306 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) was Judge Roger Vinson, appointed by
President Reagan. Vinson, Clyde Roger, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://www. c.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=2462&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited Dec. 22, 2011). Judge Conner, who struck down the individual mandate in Goudy-
Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089, 1111
(M.D. Pa. 2011) was appointed by President George W. Bush. Conner, Christopher C.,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.ljc.gov/servletlnGetlnfo?jid=2943&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011).
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Obama, affirming the ACA, was a 2-1 split decision. 2 A Demo-
cratic-appointed judge wrote the opinion, and for the first time, a
Republican-appointed judge joined and concurred in judgment,
upholding the constitutionality of the ACA.73 The third judge, also
a Republican appointee, predictably dissented 74  The Eleventh
Circuit decision in Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. De-
partment of Health & Human Services, striking down the individ-
ual mandate, was also a 2-1 split decision." The majority opinion
in that case, however, was written by both a Republican and, sur-
prisingly, a Democratic-appointed judge, while the third judge
who concurred in part and dissented in part was a Democratic ap-
pointee." Finally, the D.C. Circuit decision in Seven-Sky v. Hold-
er, upholding the Act, was a 2-1 split decision, with a Republican
appointee judge writing the majority opinion and a Democratic
judge concurring." The third judge in Seven-Sky v. Holder, a Re-
72. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
73. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 533. The court's opinion was written by Circuit
Judge Boyce F. Martin, appointed by President Carter. Id.; Martin, Boyce Ficklen Jr.,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1491&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011). Notably, Circuit Judge Sutton, a George W. Bush appointee, concurred in
part and delivered the opinion of the court, in part. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at
533; Nina Totenberg, Federal Appeals Court Upholds Health Care Law, NPR NEWS, June
29, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/06/29/137506928/federal-court-upholds-health-care-law.
United States District Judge Graham, a Reagan appointee, (sitting by designation, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) disagreed and opined that the ACA was unconstitution-
al and exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Thomas More Law Ctr.,
651 F.3d at 566 (Graham, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
74. Id. (Graham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
76. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1240 n.1. The majority opinion was joint-
ly written by Chief Judge Dubina, who was appointed by President George H. W. Bush, and
Circuit Judge Hull, who was appointed by President Clinton. Id.; Dubina, Joel Fredrick,
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servletlnGetInfo?jid=652&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Hull, Frank M., Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=1119&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011). Circuit Judge Marcus, who concurred in part and dissented in part, was
appointed by President Clinton. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1328 (Marcus, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Marcus, Stanley, Biographical Directory of Federal
Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1477&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na.
77. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The opinion was written by
Judge Silberman, appointed by President Reagan, id., and the concurrence was written by
Judge Harry Edwards, appointed by President Carter. Id. at 21 (Edwards, J., concurring);
Silberman, Laurence Hirsch, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CENTER,
http://www.fjc.gov/servletJnGetlnfo?jid=2189&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011); Edwards, Harry Thomas, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, FED.
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publican appointee, dissented as to jurisdiction, but not as to the
merits." Hopefully, these circuit court rulings herald continuing
objective and apolitical adjudication and decision making that will
remain consistent with and faithful to prior Supreme Court
precedent.
II. THE APPLICABLE LAW: MODERN SUPREME COURT COMMERCE
CLAUSE PRECEDENT
Our Constitution provides for a dual system of government; the
federal government is limited to its enumerated powers,79 and
"[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."' Under the general police power,
states may enact laws similar to the ACA that require their citi-
zens to have minimum health insurance coverage." The federal
government, however, has no such police power, and Congress can
enact a law like the ACA only if authorized by one of its enume-
rated powers, such as the Commerce Clause in Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution.82
The Commerce Clause states that "[tihe Congress shall have
power . . . [tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. '8 3 The Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause follows, stating that "[t]he Congress
shall have power ... [tlo make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States . . . ."" Key to the arguments on both sides is
JUD. CENTER, httpJ/www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=692&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na
(last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
78. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 21 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Kavanaugh, ap-
pointed by President George W. Bush, dissented as to jurisdiction on the basis of the Anti-
Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2010), and did not decide the merits. Id. at 21-23;
Kavanaugh, Brett M., FED. JUD. CENTER, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF FED. JUDGES,
http://www.fc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3114&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Dec. 22, 2011). See also supra note 57, discussing Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 635, 649 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-2347,
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) and the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a).
79. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 541.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
81. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 541 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111M, §
2 (West 2011)).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 541.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18.
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the interrelationship between these two constitutional commands.
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, however, and with spe-
cific reference to the individual mandate, opponents of the Act in
Seven Sky v. Holder argued that Congress "can effectuate only
those powers that it actually possesses under the Commerce
Clause, not create new ones."" At the same time, "[tihe right to be
free from federal regulation is not absolute, and yields to the im-
perative that Congress be free to forge national solutions to na-
tional problems, no matter how local--or seemingly passive-their
individual origins.86
At the outset, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n that Congress has the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the insurance market:"
The modern insurance business holds a commanding position
in the trade and commerce of our Nation. . . . Perhaps no
modern commercial enterprise directly affects so many per-
sons in all walks of life. Insurance touches the home, the fam-
ily, and the occupation or the business of almost every person
in the United States.8
Insurance policies are commodities in the flow of interstate
commerce. 8 Congress can regulate the price of health insurance,
because "'[i]t is well established . . .that the power to regulate
commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which
commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting
such prices. ' " To ensure that most Americans are covered by in-
surance-in this case health insurance-Congress has the power
to enact the laws necessary to enable that goal.9"
85. 661 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
86. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 14 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 369 U.S.
241, 258-59 (1964)).
87. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944), superseded by
statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006)), as recognized in U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,
507 (1993).
88. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 539-40.
89. Id. at 546-47, 552-53.
90. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32-33 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2011).
91. Koppelman, supra note 30, at *3-4.
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Congress could have established a government-run system of
universal health care--under the General Welfare Clause92-but
politically, there was no hope that a single payer system could be
enacted because powerful interest groups were allied against it. 9'
Congress decided that a government-run monopoly of health in-
surance would be not be workable and that coverage would be best
provided by the private sector.94 Under this approach, then, the
only way to guarantee health insurance for all would be to require
everyone to purchase health coverage from private insurers, in-
cluding those who are healthy.95
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress can decide
how best to exercise its powers .96 As Chief Justice Marshall wrote
almost 200 years ago in McCulloch v Maryland:
[T]he sound construction of the [C]onstitution must allow to
the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution.... Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the [C]onstitution, and all means which are appropri-
ate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
[C]onstitution, are constitutional.97
The modern reading of McCulloch was articulated in United
States v. Comstock, decided in 2010.8 In Comstock, the Court
stated that "the Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that
the United States Constitution's grants of specific federal legisla-
tive authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that
are 'convenient, or useful', or 'conducive' to the authority's 'bene-
ficial exercise."' 99 The test for whether Congress has acted within
its constitutional bounds is a rational basis test. °° Congress has
acted appropriately in passing a particular law if a court finds
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes... to pay the Debts and provide for the... general Welfare of the United States..."
Id.
93. Koppelman, supra note 30, at *4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421(1819); Koppelman, supra note 30, at *4.
97. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
98. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010); Koppelman, supra note 30, at
*4.
99. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413, 418).
100. Id. at 1956 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)).
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that "the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.
'10
The choice of means is left to the judgment of Congress, and it is
for Congress to decide whether the "means adopted are really cal-
culated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent
to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship
between the means adopted and the end to be attained....""'
Acts of Congress carry with them a presumption of constitutio-
nality, and "due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enact-
ment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds.""3 Acts of Congress are presumed valid,
not as a matter of interdepartmental etiquette, but as a matter of
due deference to the "deliberate judgment by constitutional major-
ities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their de-
legated power." 104
The modern reach of the Commerce Clause was set forth in Pe-
rez v. United States,'1 ' decided in 1971, and United States v. Lopez,
decided in 1995.06 The Supreme Court has held that Congress
may regulate three broad categories of activity under its com-
merce power: (1) "the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce,"' ° (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities,"' 8 and (3) "those activi-
ties having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e.,
those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. "1°'
The case for and against the individual mandate of the ACA turns
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1957 (citing Burroughs v. United States, 209 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934)).
103. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 541 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)).
104. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 541 (quoting United States v. Five Gambling
Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953)).
105. 402 U.S. 146(1971).
106. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (citations omitted).
108. Id. (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 558-59 (citation omitted). See also Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 554
(Sutton, J., concurring). Congress may regulate: "(1) the channels of interstate commerce
(e.g., rivers and roads), (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., ships and
cars) as well as persons or things in it, and (3) those other economic activities, even wholly
intrastate activities, that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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on whether or not Congress exceeded its commerce clause power
under the third category. 110
The existence of the third category was established in the 1937
decision of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.' and in the
1941 decision of United States v. Darby."2 In Darby, the Supreme
Court held that the power of Congress over interstate commerce
was not limited to the regulation of commerce among the states."3
"It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate
commerce .. . as to make regulation of them [an] appropriate
means to the attainment of a legitimate end . ,,1"" The Supreme
Court has long held, then, that under this prong of the commerce
power, Congress can regulate two types of conduct: (1) economic
activity, even intrastate economic activity, if it substantially af-
fects interstate commerce,"' and (2) non-economic, non-
commercial activity, if control of that activity is essential to effect
a larger economic regulatory scheme."6 The controlling case law
was set forth in the landmark decisions of Wickard v. Filburn,"7
Gonzales v Raich,"' United States v. Lopez,"9 and United States v.
Morrison."'
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that Congress
could regulate the intrastate, seemingly inconsequential, non-
commercial activity of single individuals, if that activity, added up
with the identical activity of numerous others, would have a sub-
stantial impact on interstate commerce.'21 The Court upheld pro-
110. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp.2d 16, 32 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hu-
man Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1273-74, 1284-85 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 635, 633-34 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-
2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
111. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
112. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
113. Darby, 312 U.S. at 118.
114. Id.
115. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Gon-
zales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
116. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 541-42 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 127-28 (1942)).
117. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
118. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
119. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
120. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
121. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 127-28.
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visions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938122 that re-
stricted the amount of wheat that an individual farmer could
grow, even for his own home use .' The statute was designed to
stabilize wheat prices on the interstate market. 124 By regulating
the volume of wheat moving in interstate and foreign commerce,
Congress could avert shortages and surpluses and corresponding
fluctuations in the price of wheat.'2 ' A farmer challenged a penal-
ty that was imposed on him for exceeding his quota. The farmer
(Roscoe Filburn) claimed that he used the excess wheat for his
own personal consumption, not for the commercial market, and
that Congress had no power to penalize him under the Commerce
Clause because his activity was local and not commercial in na-
ture. 1
26
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the wheat "supplies
a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected
by purchases on the open market."127 By growing his own wheat
for his own use, the farmer was able to avoid buying it on the open
market.' Even though the farmer's activity "be local and though
it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its na-
ture, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial effect on
interstate commerce .... ,,129 Further, though the farmer's detri-
mental impact on the total demand for wheat may have been in-
significant by itself, the Court ruled that "it is not enough to re-
move him from the scope of federal regulation, whereas here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial."' Thus, without the power to regu-
late this class of individual activity, the government's ability to
achieve its overarching objective-the regulation of the interstate
wheat market and the stabilization of wheat prices-would be un-
dercut.
Gonzales v. Raich' was decided sixty-three years later, in 2005.
California had enacted a statute-the Compassionate Use Act of
122. Id. at 113 nn.1-2 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1340 (Supp. No. 1 1941); 7 U.S.C. § 1281-1310
(1938)).
123. Id. at 118.
124. Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
125. Id.
126. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 29 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at
118-20), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
127. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 30 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
130. Id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128).
131. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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1996-that allowed qualified patients to obtain, possess, or grow
marijuana for their personal medicinal use.'3 2 The statute permit-
ted the intrastate, non-commercial possession or cultivation of
marijuana for therapeutic purposes upon a physician's recommen-
dation.33 Pursuant to its national war on drugs, Congress enacted
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act to
combat the international and interstate trade in illicit drugs.'
Under title II of that act, the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"),
the production and possession of marijuana were categorically
prohibited.' Two California plaintiffs-medical patients who had
been growing and using marijuana for their own medical treat-
ment pursuant to the California law--challenged the CSA"'
The Supreme Court upheld the CSA, using a rationale very sim-
ilar to that used in Wickard.'37 The Court ruled that the produc-
tion and consumption of marijuana for medical treatment was a
"quintessentially economic" activity, ' and similar to the fact pat-
tern in Wickard, the plaintiffs were "cultivating, for home con-
sumption, a fungible commodity for which there is an established,
albeit illegal, interstate market."'39 The Court agreed with Con-
gress' findings that the high demand for marijuana would likely
draw the homegrown product into the interstate market.40 In de-
ciding whether Congress acted within the bounds of its commerce
power, the Court stated that the task before it was straightfor-
ward.' The Court emphasized that "[wie need not determine
whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate, substan-
tially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'ra-
tional basis exists for so concluding.""42 The Court held that Con-
gress had a rational basis for concluding that failure to regulate
the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana would sub-
stantially undercut the larger regulatory scheme and that failure
132. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id. at 12-13 (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 15.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
138. Id. The non-commercial production and consumption of marijuana for personal
medicinal use was economic because "[elconomics refers to the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities." Id. at 25 (quotations omitted).
139. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).
140. Id. at 19.
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id. (citations omitted).
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to do so "would leave a gaping hole in the CSA." 4' Congress has
never been required to legislate with mathematical precision. '
As a result, "[w]hen Congress decides that the 'total incidence' of a
practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the
entire class."'45 Congress acted within its authority in Wickard
when it enacted comprehensive legislation to control the price of
wheat on the national market, and that congressional action was a
necessary and proper exercise of its commerce power.4 ' The fact
that the CSA "ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no
moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise
individual components of that larger scheme."'47 Finally, in order
to effectively assert its commerce power and secure its objectives,
Congress can reach even those purely intrastate and local activi-
ties that may be inconsequential in isolation and without substan-
tial effect nationwide.
4 8
Though the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce
Clause power very broadly, that power has not been without lim-
its. The Court stated in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
that the commerce power:
[MIust be considered in the light of our dual system of gov-
ernment and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to em-
brace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government.'
In United States v. Lopez"' and United States v. Morrison,"' the
Court struck down single subject criminal statutes that were held
to exceed Congress' power under the Commerce Clause."' In Lo-
pez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun Free School Zones
143. Id.
144. Gonzales, 545 U.S at 17.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 35 (Scalia J., concurring).
149. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (citations omitted).
150. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
151. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
152. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 542 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Act of 1990 ("GFSZA"),"3 and, in Morrison, the Court invalidated
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA")."5
The GFSZA (in Lopez) made it a federal offense for any individ-
ual to possess a firearm in a school zone."' The Government ar-
gued that possession of a firearm in a school zone substantially
affected interstate commerce in three ways.' First, guns in
school zones could result in violent crime, and violent crime affects
the national economy through insurance costs, which are spread
throughout the population.'57 Second, violent crime makes people
afraid to travel to parts of the country that they believe are un-
safe."' Third, guns in schools threaten the educational process
and impair the learning environment."' A damaged educational
process leads to a less productive citizenry, and a less productive
citizenry may ultimately have a deleterious effect on the national
160economy.
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Congress had exceeded
its authority under the Commerce Clause and ruled the GFSZA
unconstitutional for several reasons."' The Court held that pos-
session of a firearm in a school was not an economic activity that
might, by replication elsewhere and aggregation, have a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce. In fact, the GFSZA was a
criminal statute that had nothing to do with commercial or eco-
nomic activity, and there was no overarching regulatory scheme
that would be undercut if gun possession in intrastate local school
zones were not prohibited."' Furthermore, the GFSZA contained
no requirement that the gun possession had to be connected in any
way with interstate commerce.' The law contained no jurisdic-
tional nexus to tie it concretely to interstate as opposed to purely
intrastate activity.'
153. 514 U.S. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988)).
154. 529 U.S. at 601-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981).
155. 514 U.S. at 551. A school zone was defined as on or within 1000 feet of the grounds
of a school. Id. at 551 ni (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)).





161. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 561, 567-68.
162. Id. at 551, 561.
163. Id. at 561.
164. Id. at 567.
165. Id. at 551, 561.
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Notwithstanding the deference owed to the legislature's findings
regarding the cause and effect relationship between guns in school
zones and interstate commerce---"no ... substantial effect [on in-
terstate commerce] was visible to the naked eye," and Congres-
sional findings substantially linking gun violence to interstate
commerce were lacking."' In order to uphold the Government's
contentions, the Court "would have to pile inference upon infe-
rence in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of
the sort retained by the States."6 7 The Court recognized that
many of its prior decisions gave a great deal of deference to Con-
gress, and the language in those opinions allowed for additional
expansion of the commerce power.168 Here, however, the Supreme
Court declined to go any further, fearing that "there never will be
a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly lo-
cal."169
In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
("VAWA"), which created a federal remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence.7 Applying the reasoning in Lopez, the Court
again held that Congress' regulatory power under the Commerce
Clause was not unlimited."' The Court invalidated the VAWA,
because gender-based crimes of violence are not economic activi-
ties.172 The Supreme Court held that "[w]hile we need not adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconom-
ic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of in-
trastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature."17'
Furthermore, the VAWA contained no jurisdictional element con-
necting the federal cause of action to interstate commerce.
174
Though there were plenty of congressional findings regarding the
serious impact of gender-motivated violence on victims and their
families, Congress' findings alone were not sufficient to make the
166. Lopez, 514 U.S at 562-63.
167. Id. at 567.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 567-68 (citation omitted).
170. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).






Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause."' Again, notwith-
standing the deference owed to the lawmakers' findings, it is ulti-
mately up to the Supreme Court, rather than Congress, to decide
whether particular activities affect interstate commerce to a suffi-
cient degree as to come under the reach of the commerce power."'
Finally, the Court held that the rational basis connection prof-
fered by Congress, between gender-motivated violent crime and
interstate commerce, was too much of a logical stretch; the link
was too attenuated.77 Here, the Court held that the government's
reasoning "seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always
been the prime object of the States' police power) to every atte-
nuated effect upon interstate commerce."7 ' If laws were upheld on
this basis, Congress could apply the Commerce Clause without
restraint and completely obliterate the Constitutional demarca-
tion between the legitimate ambit of national government and the
broad range of local powers properly reserved to the states. 9
In summary, as applied to the ACA, Wickard, Lopez, Morrison,
and Gonzales establish a three-pronged inquiry to determine
whether the individual mandate to purchase health insurance can
pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause.8 ° The
applicable analytical framework was set forth by United States
District Court Judge Gladys Kessler in Mead v. Holder.' First,
does the purchase or non-purchase of health insurance, or does the
decision whether or not to buy health insurance, comprise econom-
ic activity as in Wickard and Gonzales or non-economic activity as
in Lopez and Morrison?'82 Second, if the activity is found to be
economic, did Congress have a rational basis to conclude that
these activities substantially affect the health care market-when
replicated by the entire applicable population and taken in the
aggregate?'83 Third, is the regulation of this target activity an es-
175. Id. at 614. "Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so." Id. (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
176. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (citation omitted).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 615.
179. Id.
180. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 16 (2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v. Holder,
661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
181. Id.




sential part of a larger regulatory regime, and would that regula-
tory scheme be undercut if that key regulation were eliminated?..
III. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE OF THE ACA WAS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF CONGRESS' POWER UNDER LONG-STANDING TENETS
OF COMMERCE CLAUSE AND NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
PRECEDENT
A. The Individual Mandate Regulates Economic Activity Subject
to the Commerce Power
In applying the relevant constitutional law, a court must first
determine exactly what class of activities is regulated under the
minimum coverage requirement. 185 Proponents of the narrow view
hold that the mandate regulates conduct in the national health
insurance market by forcing individual, private citizens to buy a
minimum level of coverage. They argue that by so doing, the
government is impermissibly infringing the rights of private citi-
zens to choose whether or not to buy health insurance, and they
believe that their personal choices have nothing to do with inter-
state commerce. 187 By contrast, proponents of the broader view
contend that the mandate regulates activity in the comprehensive
arena of the national health care market,"' because the overarch-
ing purpose of the ACA is to improve access to quality health care
for all Americans."9 In Thomas More Law Center, the court es-
poused this broad view in holding that in enacting the ACA, Con-
gress is requiring every applicable citizen to buy health insurance,
not as an end in itself, but because of the economic effect of that
aggregated activity on the total national health care market,
which Congress can regulate in this context.'9' The court stated
that "[n]o matter how you slice the relevant market-as obtaining
health care, as paying for health care, as insuring for health
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted).
186. Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1097-98 (M.D. Pa. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 567-68 (Graham, J., dissent-
ing in part as to the Commerce Clause analysis).
187. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 566-68 (citations omitted). See infra Part IV.
188. Id. at 543 (citations omitted).
189. Farley, supra note 8, at 43.
190. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 543-44, 546, 549 (citations omitted).
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care-all of these activities affect interstate commerce, in a sub-
stantial way. " '
Virtually every American will require health care services at
some time during his or her lifetime. '92 In essence, virtually every
American will have to participate in the health care market-
electively or emergently, voluntarily or involuntarily. In the Unit-
ed States, health care is not free. The only variable is how people
pay for these inevitable services. They can either purchase health
insurance or pay the total cost out of pocket. '93 If people choose
not to buy health insurance, they in effect self-insure. '94 The self-
insured assume calculated risks. In theory, these individuals
would set aside funds or arrange their finances to provide for their
future medical needs.9 The individual mandate, in its narrowest
construction, would regulate the conduct of these non-participants
in the insurance market by forcing them to buy a minimum level
of coverage.196 In actuality, however, the mandate regulates the
comprehensive activity of near-universal participation in the in-
terstate health care delivery market, and specifically regulates the
activity of self-insuring to pay for health care services consumed. 9'
Self-insuring, in this context, is economic activity.9
The Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich defined the term "eco-
nomics" as referring to "the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of commodities."'99 Consumption of health care fits neat-
ly within this definition. Virtually no one can opt out of this mar-
ket, because everyone will ultimately need and receive medical
care, and they will necessarily have to pay for the services they
receive. 200 Again, to finance that cost, people can either purchase
insurance or self-pay, and those that decline to buy health insur-
ance, in fact, self-insure.21' The individual mandate will eliminate
the option of self-insuring when it becomes effective beginning in
January 2014."0
191. Id. at 556 (Sutton, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 548.
193. Id. at 543.
194. Id.
195. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 543.
196. Id. at 543, 557, 564-66 (Sutton, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 543-44.
198. Id. at 544.
199. Id. (citing Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005)).
200. Id.
201. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 543.
202. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 5000A, 124 Stat.
119, 244 (2010) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2010)), amended by Health Care
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The interstate market for health care services derives from the
universal need for medical care and the requirement that patients
pay for the virtually inevitable services received.2"3 Note, however,
that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of
1986 ("EMTALA") is unique to the United States' health care
market.2 4 EMTALA affects all hospitals that participate in Medi-S 205
care and have active emergency departments. EMTALA re-
quires that when any patient arrives in need of care, that hospit-
als must appropriately screen that patient for an emergency medi-
cal condition and stabilize that patient appropriately-without
regard to whether the patient has insurance and without regard to
whether or not the patient can pay.2 6 Persons who self-insure
may have saved sufficient funds to pay for the care they received.
Others will have to rely on the free care that providers render,
either through charity or as required by law.
There is virtually no other market that commands its purveyors
to serve a designated class of consumers for free. Thus, those who
self-insure in the health care market enjoy the safety net of free
services required by law, and that cost $80 billion in 2008, accord-
ing to Congress' findings.2 7 According to a recent report from the
Department of Health and Human Services, approximately two-
thirds of the unpaid medical costs in 2008 were attributable to
hospital care, and United States hospitals reported more than 2.1
million hospitalizations for the uninsured that year. The study
found that most uninsured individuals have virtually no savings
and few have resources sufficient to pay in full any hospital bills
they might potentially incur. The average cost of a single hospi-
talization in 2008 was $22,200. 2"' As will be shown subsequently,
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in
scattered sections of 20, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
203. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010), afftd,
651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10106, 124 Stat.
119, 907 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F) (2010)).
208. ANDRE CHAPPEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION,
OFFICE OF HEALTH POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE VALUE OF HEALTH
INSURANCE: FEW OF THE UNINSURED HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO PAY POTENTIAL
HOSPITAL BILLS 2, 5 (2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/Valueoflnsurance/rb.pdf In 2008, 58% of the hos-
pital bills for the uninsured exceeded $10,000. Id. at 5.
209. Id. at 1-2.
210. Id. at 8.
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the cost of that free care to the uninsured-or more broadly, the
cost of their access to the national health care market-results in
a significant financial impact on the insured population, in the
form of increased premiums for individuals and families.21 ' The
individual mandate was enacted to significantly reduce the
amount of uncompensated care, which should in turn result in the
economic effect of reduced insurance premiums and more afforda-
ble health care for all Americans.212
The individual mandate, then, does regulate economic activi-
ty.213 As the court stated in Thomas More Law Ctr., "[bly requir-
ing individuals to maintain a certain level of coverage, the indi-
vidual mandate regulates the financing of health care services,
and specifically, the practice of self-insuring for the cost of care."214
The activity of purchasing a health insurance policy is thus eco-
nomic activity. 215 The act of not buying health insurance is ipso
facto the activity of self-insuring, and the choice to pay for health
care by self-insuring is economic activity of no less weight and
moment-and that holds true whether it be a voluntary choice or
involuntary self-denial due to unaffordable costs. Contrary to
popular belief, a 2009 study by the director of the Congressional
Budget Office found that not all of the uninsured had to forgo
medical care because they could not afford the insurance pre-
miums."' Forty-three per cent of the nearly 50 million uninsured
Americans were "voluntarily uninsured;" in other words, forty-
three percent of the uninsured had disposable income sufficient to
purchase health insurance. 21' Thus, as the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, "[t]he financing of health care services, and specifi-
cally the practice of self- insuring, is economic activity."
218
The courts in Mead2"5 and Liberty University220 applied similar
analyses, but characterized the purchase or rejection of health
211. See infra Parts III.B, C.
212. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(a)(2)(F)-(J).
213. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011).
214. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 544.
215. Id.
216. Hall, supra note 34, at 474 (citing JUNE O'NEILL & DAVE O'NEILL, WHO ARE THE
UNINSURED, AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICA'S UNINSURED POPULATION, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
AND THEIR HEALTH (2009), available at http://epionline.org/studies/oneill-06-2009.pdf).
217. Id. (internal citations omitted).
218. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 544.
219. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1, (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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insurance as decisions, rather than activities. 2 ' These decisions
about health coverage-whether to buy or not to buy-were eco-
nomic in nature, and therefore, represented economic activity.
22
Both the Mead and Liberty opinions cited South-Eastern Under-
writers2 ' and reiterated the rule that Congress can regulate the
national insurance market, because insurance contracts are com-
modities moving in interstate commerce.224 In Mead, the court
stated that "the power to regulate commerce includes the power to
regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are
dealt with and practices affecting such prices."2 Congress is thus
empowered under the Commerce Clause to regulate the price of
health insurance, and Congress can ban the medical underwriting
practices that have made health coverage unaffordable for mil-
lions of individuals.226 In summary, the underlying fact is that:
Both the decision to purchase health insurance and its flip
side-the decision not to purchase health insurance--
therefore relate to the consumption of a commodity: a health
insurance policy .... It therefore follows that both decisions,
whether positive or negative, are clearly economic ones ....
This case involves an economic activity: deciding whether or
not to purchase health insurance.227
B. The Regulated Activity, When Aggregated Together, Substan-
tially Impacts the National Health Insurance Market
Deciding whether or not to buy health insurance is an economic
activity or, alternatively, an economic decision about how health
care services will be paid for when needed.228  People who forgo
220. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated
and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8,
2011).
221. Id.; Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33.
222. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33; Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 633-34.
223. United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1944), superseded by
statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 22 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1011 (2006)), as recognized in U.S. Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500
(1993)).
224. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33. See also Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp.2d at 631.
225. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942)).
226. Examples of these practices include assessments of higher premium rates or de-
nials of coverage based on past medical history, pre-existing conditions, and/or current
state of health. See Hall, supra note 34.
227. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (citations omitted).
228. Id. See also Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 543-44 (6th Cir.
2011) (internal citations omitted).
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health insurance self-insure.229 Because this is an economic activi-
ty or decision, Congress had a rational basis to find that when rep-
licated and aggregated nationwide, the practice of self-insuring
against the cost of health care substantially affects interstate
commerce-specifically the national health insurance market and
more generally the entire United States' health care delivery sys-
tem.23 In addition to the findings summarized earlier,23' Congress
found that health insurance and health care spending is projected
to increase from $2.5 trillion or 17.6% of the economy in 2009 to
$4.7 trillion in 2019.22 Private health insurance spending was
projected to be $854 billion in 2009, which paid for medical sup-
plies, drugs, and equipment-all shipped in interstate com-
merce. Because most health insurance is sold by national or re-
gional companies, it is sold and claims are paid through interstate
234commerce.
Regarding the uninsured, the economy loses $207 billion per
year due to their poorer health and shorter life spans.23' The ag-
gregated cost of uncompensated care in 2008 amounted to forty-
three billion dollars. 236 Additionally, sixty-two percent of all per-
237sonal bankruptcies were caused in part by medical expenses.
Congress found that forty-seven million Americans were unin-
sured in 2008, 23' and more recently, it was estimated that about
fifty million non-elderly Americans were uninsured in 2009-
18.8% of the non-elderly United States population.239
The cost of uncompensated care is borne by all. Providers re-
cover their unpaid dollars by increasing their charges for private
229. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 543-44 (internal citation omitted).
230. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 34.
231. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat.
119, 242-44 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2010)).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (2010).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. § (a)(2)(E).
236. Id. § (a)(2)(F).
237. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat.
119, 243 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (2010)).
238. 47 Million and Counting: Why The Health Care Marketplace Is Broken, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chair-
man, S. Comm. on Fin.), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/library/hearings/download/?id=f8c43c-eec6-445b-bfc0-
90e0260b2012.
239. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2010 23 T.8 (2010)).
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insurance.24 ° Those charges are billed to private insurers, which in
turn pass their costs on to American families in the form of in-
flated health insurance premiums. 241  The rising premiums from
this cost shifting process make health insurance unaffordable for
increasing numbers of Americans.242 As a result, more and more
individuals are forced out of the market.243  This results in a
smaller total insured population, which in turn exacerbates and
perpetuates the cycle.244 As indicated earlier, most uninsured in-
dividuals cannot pay the medical costs they incur,2" and, as frank-
ly expressed in Mead, the uninsured "will ultimately get a 'free
ride' on the backs of those Americans who have made responsible
choices to provide for the illness we must all face at some point in
our lives.""6
According to the courts' reasoning in Thomas More Law Center,
Liberty University, and Mead, those who forgo insurance self-
insure, and thereby, engage in economic activity.247 Congress,
therefore, could rationally determine that this represents econom-
ic activity, that in the aggregate substantially impacts interstate
commerce because of the cost-shifting phenomenon and its mea-
surable effects nationwide. Because of the uncompensated care
provided to the uninsured, the insured population pays ever-
increasing premiums that in turn force-increasing numbers of in-
dividuals out of the market.48 There is hardly a logical stretch in
this context between cause and effect. This is the immutable cal-
culus of the insurance industry-far different from the non-
persuasive and highly attenuated chain of effects that the Su-
preme Court rejected in Lopez and Morrison.249 The congressional
findings that justify the ACA are not the products of "inference
upon inference"20 or dubious "but-for causal chain [s] "2 that would
240. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 545.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F).




246. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34 n.10 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-
Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This footnote was directed at the particular
plaintiffs in Judge Kessler's courtroom who had made a deliberate, voluntary choice to
decline health insurance because of constitutional and religious objections and because the
individual mandate would have forced them to adjust their financial affairs. Id.
247. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 544.
248. Id. at 545.
249. Id.
250. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
251. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000).
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result in a breach of the boundaries between the federal govern-
ment and the states' police powers if legislation were upheld on
those insufficient grounds.
Viewed from a different perspective, the rationale for the indi-
vidual mandate can be readily analogized to the fact pattern in
Wickard v. Filburn.252 Like the farmer who grew wheat for his
own home consumption, those who self-insure provide for their
health care costs by relying on and consuming their own financial
resources."' By so doing, they supply their own needs for a given
commodity, avoid having to buy it on the open market, and fru-
strate the government's objective, which was stabilizing wheat
prices at the time of Wickard and providing affordable health care
today. Whether it be growing wheat for home consumption as in
Wickard, growing marijuana for one's own medical use as in
Raich, or forgoing health insurance and self-insuring in the con-
text of the national health care market, Congress could rationally
conclude that these seemingly de minimis, non-commercial activi-
ties of individuals, when multiplied by the identical conduct of
others similarly situated across the United States, substantially
affects interstate commerce. 2" Absent regulation of that targeted
activity, the success of the legislation sub judice would be substan-
tially impaired.255
As in Morrison, the findings and acts of the legislature are pre-
sumed constitutional through the mutual deference due between
coordinate branches of government. 2" As in Lopez and Raich, the
role of the courts is not to second-guess the findings of the legisla-
ture; rather, the courts need only determine whether a rational
basis exists for Congress' conclusion that the regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce. 257 Here, there is a ra-
tional basis for the lawmakers' findings. There is an undisputable
causal link between the growing population of citizens who lack
health insurance, the cost shifting effect of the unpaid health ser-
vices they consume, the declining numbers in the healthy insured
population pool, the climbing health insurance premiums for those
252. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 634 (W.D. Va. 2010), vacated
and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8,
2011) (citation omitted).
253. Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 634 (citation omitted).
254. Id. at 634-35 (citations omitted).
255. Id.
256. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (citations omitted).
257. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (citations omitted); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (citations omitted).
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with insurance, and the present day crisis in the national health
insurance and general health care markets.58
C. The Individual Mandate is Essential for the Success of the
Larger Regulatory Scheme of the ACA-Reforming the Na-
tional Health Care Market and Reducing the Cost of Health
Care for All
The minimum coverage requirement is not a standalone provi-
sion, but instead represents the critical foundation upon which
rests the success of the overarching regulatory goal in the ACA.
Put another way, the individual mandate is an essential part of
the total economic regulatory regime for comprehensive health
care reform in this country, and affordable medical care for all. In
its strictest context, the mandate forbids individuals from self-
insuring against the risks of unpredictable and potentially limit-
less health care costs."' Nonetheless, when Congress rationally
finds that an aggregate practice threatens a nationwide market, it
may regulate the entire class of activity,26 ° and "[wihere necessary
to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress
may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not them-
selves substantially affect interstate commerce."26 ' Congress is
authorized under the Constitution to make all laws necessary and
proper to carry out its Commerce Clause powers."
The mandate commands that all applicable individuals acquire
a minimum level of health insurance coverage. The court opinions
upholding the individual mandate have all held that a citizen's
choice to buy health insurance is unequivocally an economic activ-
ity, as is an individual's choice to forego health insurance and self-
insure.263 Therefore, the health insurance business and the na-
tional market for health care services are fair game for regulation
under the Commerce Clause. Even if, however, the activity of self-
insuring was found to be non-economical, non-commercial intras-
tate activity, Congress could still regulate the conduct if its larger
258. Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35.
259. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 543 (6th Cir. 2011).
260. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted).
261. Id. at 35 (Scalia J., concurring).
262. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
263. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky
v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F.
Supp. 2d at 633-34 (citation omitted); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d
882, 893-94 (E.D. Mich. 2010), afftd, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
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objective would be undercut absent that prerogative.264  The in
cremental effect of any person's individual acts intrastate is of no
moment. "ITihe only thing that matters is whether the national
problem Congress has identified is one that substantially affects
interstate commerce,"265 and it matters not whether the affected
individual himself is actively participating: "Whether any particu-
lar person is, or is not, also engaged in interstate commerce.., is
a mere fortuitous circumstance that has no bearing on Congress's
power to regulate an injury to interstate commerce. " "' When rep-
licated and aggregated across the nation, individual choices about
providing for health care are economic activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.267
The importance of the individual mandate is crystal clear when
viewed from the perspective of the fundamental economics of the
insurance business. Professor Mark Hall illustrated how insur-
ance markets operate in the absence of the ACA reforms.268 A
2005 study of the breakdown of total health care spending accord-
ing to percentages of the population showed that 25% of total
health care dollars were spent on behalf of 1% of the population
and that 80% of total dollars were attributable to 20% of the popu-
lation.2 " By contrast, the majority of people, 80% of the popula-
tion, account for only 20% of the total costs. 2 70  Professor Hall
termed this the "80/20 rule."27 ' In summary, there is a dispropor-
tionately high concentration of health care dollars spent on behalf
of a relatively small number of people who incur very high medical
costs.
2 72
To preserve their profits against this high risk segment, insur-
ance companies either deny coverage, charge increased premiums
264. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 18. See also id., 545 U.S. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring)
('Congress' regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of
interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause .... Where necessary to make a
regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate
activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce." (citations omit-
ted)).
265. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 19.
266. Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S 110, 121 (1942) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
267. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34 (citations omitted); Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp.
2d at 633-34; Thomas More Law Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94.
268. Hall, supra note 34, at 459-60.
269. Id. at 460.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 461 (internal citation omitted).
272. Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted).
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based on past and current medical history, exclude coverage of
pre-existing conditions, or limit the amounts of coverage af-
forded . This is the practice of medical underwriting that was
alluded to earlier.7 4 Insurance companies also spread the charges
among the entire population pool, in order to keep premiums af-
fordable for everyone, but the extreme costs at the high end-i.e.,
the 20% of the population who account for 80% of spending-
explain the high cost of health insurance, and why these costs may
be particularly distasteful for those who are presently healthy.
Insurance companies gain by avoiding high-risk populations, or by
charging discriminatory, elevated premiums to this group. They
also gain by enrolling the large pools of healthy customers, and
the health insurers compete to attract these profitable, low risk
275
groups.
The ACA commands health insurers to sell coverage to all com-
ers, and forbids recourse to medical underwriting and the other
customary risk-mitigating practices that defined the industry pre-
ACA.27 Health insurance companies are profit-making businesses
that seek to enroll healthy, low risk customers-populations that
actuarially would not be predicted to generate costly payouts in
the near future. Insurers profit by avoiding applicants with high-
er risks or charging these customers higher prices; at the same
time they face major losses if they fail to enroll substantial num-
bers of lower risk applicants.277 The ACA imposes forced "adverse
selection"271 on these companies, and commands them to enroll
people with pre-existing conditions who are sick ab initio-
applicants they could formerly reject, deny, cancel, or surcharge
273. Approximately 36% of applicants for individual health insurance are denied cover-
age, charged a higher premium, or are offered only limited coverage that excludes pre-
existing conditions. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 546 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COVERAGE DENIED: HOW THE CURRENT
HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM LEAVES MILLIONS BEHIND 1 (2009), available at
http://healthreform.gov/reports/deniedcoverage/coveragedenied.pdf).
274. See supra note 227. See also Hall, supra note 34, at 462-63 (discussing medical
underwriting).
275. Hall, supra note 34, at 462 (internal citations omitted).
276. President Barack Obama & Vice President Joseph Biden, Remarks by the President
and Vice President at Signing of the Health Insurance Reform Bill (Mar. 23, 2010) (tran-
script available at 2010 WL 1043496 and http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-and-vice-president-signing-healthinsurance-reform-bill.
277. 47 Million and Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace is Broken: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 238, at 13 (statement of Professor Mark A. Hall).
278. See Hall supra note 34, at 463 (describing adverse selection) (internal citations
omitted).
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pre-ACA-and whose payout costs beget a loss for the company. 9
Absent the individual mandate, few might be inclined to buy
health insurance before they get sick." ° Post-ACA, if enrollments
were purely voluntary, the only individuals who might buy health
insurance would be those who are older, in poorer than average
health, and who might imminently require costly medical services.
The rest-without the minimum coverage requirement and know-
ing that insurance companies cannot reject them-might predict-
ably purchase their health insurance en route to the hospital
(much like, as alluded to earlier, the home owner applying for fire
insurance as the house burns down, when the law prohibits the
insurer from denying him). This would amount to compulsory
"adverse selection" on the part of the insurance companies-
forcing them to cover a high risk applicant at the time the risk
materializes."' Without the right to mitigate losses through dis-
criminatory medical underwriting, mandatory "adverse selection"
would bankrupt the industry.282
The ACA builds upon and preserves the private health insur-
ance market. The loss of insurance carriers would frustrate not
only the immediate objective of the ACA-near universal health
coverage at affordable prices-but also the overarching compre-
hensive reform package that affordable premiums would have
enabled. The individual mandate forces all applicable citizens into
the nationwide insurance pool, regardless of their state of health.
By increasing the size of the healthy insurance pool and spreading
the costs over a much larger paying population, health insurance
premiums would drop to affordable levels. This would enable near
universal health care coverage and substantially mitigate the
massive problem of uncompensated care. Congress, therefore, had
a rational basis to conclude that the individual mandate is essen-
tial to the success of the ACA, that the purpose would be fru-
strated absent the mandate, and that the mandate represents an
279. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010), affd,
651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
280. Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, Do Individual Mandates Matter?, TIMELY
ANALYSIS IMMEDIATE HEALTH POL'Y ISSUES (Urban Institute, Wash., D.C.) Jan. 2008,
available at http'/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411603 individual mandates.pdf.
281. Id. at 1-2. See also Hall, supra note 34, at 463 (internal citations omitted).
282. Hall, supra note 34, at 463 (internal citations omitted). This was born out in actual
fact. Early ACA regulations required insurers to accept all children under age 19, without
regard to pre-existing conditions, starting three years before the individual mandate came
into effect. Most of the major insurers discontinued selling child-only coverage. Id. at 470-
71 (internal citations omitted).
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appropriate means toward the achievement of the larger goal of
reforming the national health insurance system; in other words, a
necessary and proper exercise of Congress' powers under the
Commerce Clause."' Here, consistent with Chief Justice Mar-
shall's words from almost two hundred years ago, the end is "legi-
timate" and "within the scope of the [C]onstitution."2 2 The means
are "appropriate, [and] plainly adapted to that end ... [and] not
prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
[C] onstitution ....
IV. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ARE AT
BEST UNPERSUASIVE AND AT WORST REPRESENT BARE PARTISAN
POLITICS
The gravamen of the opponents' case against the ACA is the
constitutionality of the individual mandate or minimum coverage
requirement,2 86 and whether the individual mandate falls within
or beyond Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause."
Judge Vinson, writing for the Northern District of Florida, elo-
quently embraced and ennobled the conservative and libertarian
positions:
[T]his case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise leg-
islation, or whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad
problems in our health care system. In fact it is not really
about our health care system at all. It is principally about our
federalist system, and it raises very important issues regard-
ing the Constitutional role of the federal government.288
283. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 35 (D.D.C. 2011) affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
284. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
285. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421).
286. Starting in 2014, every citizen (except those who qualify for one of the enumerated
statutory exceptions) must buy health insurance or pay a penalty. 26 U.S.C. § 5000(A)(a),
(b)(1), (d), (e) (2011).
287. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307,
1309 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen.
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in
part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
288. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp.
2d 1256, 1263 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. At-
torney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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This was the case that was filed minutes after the ACA was
signed into law. The challenge was filed by Florida's attorney
general and was joined by the governors and/or attorneys general
of twenty-six states.289 This was the first decision that found the
individual mandate unconstitutional.29 °
A. The Individual Mandate is Unconstitutional Because the
Commerce Clause Regulates Activity, and Forgoing Health In-
surance Is Inactivity, Not Activity
In Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, the court pointed out that every Commerce Clause
challenge in this nation's history involved an unequivocal activi-
ty-a voluntary, active choice to enter into an affirmative type of
economic (or even non-economic) activity, which in the aggregate
substantially affected interstate commerce. 9' In every application
of the commerce power affirmed by the Supreme Court, there was
"some form of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an
individual or legal entity."292 Roscoe Filburn was in the farming
business and voluntarily chose to grow wheat.9 Angel Raich vo-
luntarily consumed locally grown marijuana provided for her own
medical use, and her co-challenger and co-user of medical mariju-
ana, Diane Monson, grew her own product.294 All of these plain-
tiffs had been pre-existing players in their respective markets
when they were prosecuted under the contested regulations.29
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,296 the Court invoked
the Commerce Clause to forbid Atlanta innkeepers from discrimi-
nating against African Americans.297 Owners and managers of
places of public accommodation were compelled to accept guests
and travelers without regard to race, religion, or nationality.
29 8
Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung,29 9 the owners of Ollie's Bar-
289. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 n.1.
290. Id. at 1263, 1305-07.
291. Id. at 1286-87.
292. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010),
vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
293. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US 111, 114 (1942).
294. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 US 1, 7-8 (2005).
295. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 n.2.
296. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
297. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 558 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247).
298. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 247 (citation omitted).
299. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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becue in Birmingham, Alabama were compelled to serve African
Americans, and racial discrimination against customers was pro-
hibited.00 These regulations were upheld under the commerce
power, because in the aggregate, racial discrimination by inns or
restaurants substantially impedes interstate travel by people of
3011color, and thereby, substantially impairs interstate commerce.
In both of these cases, the plaintiff business owners in Georgia
and Alabama were compelled to act against their will, much like
the complainants in the ACA challenges who oppose the individu-
al mandate.0 2 Unlike the opponents of the ACA, however, the At-
lanta motel keeper and the Birmingham restaurateur were active-
ly in business when the contested regulations were enforced
against them.0 3 Neither of these appellants claimed that they had
been inactive, nonparticipants in their respective marketplaces. 4
Neither of these businessmen had been compelled to open inns or
restaurants in the first instance.
The ACA challenge, then, presents a unique issue, because the
complainants before the courts-the medically uninsured-believe
themselves to be passive subjects who never entered the relevant
stream of commerce. By deliberate choice, these individuals
eschewed the health insurance market. Never before, under the
commerce power, had Congress ordered nonparticipant individu-
als to involuntarily enter a market, and never before has Congress
forced unwilling individuals to buy an unwanted commodity from
a private seller.30 ' The opponents of the individual mandate fer-
vently assert that the status of being uninsured is passive econom-
ic inactivity.37 To them, the regulation of inactivity is unprece-
300. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 270 (Black, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04 (citation omitted).
301. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 273-75 (Black, J., concurring); Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 300-04.
302. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 268-69 (Black, J., concurring).
303. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 558-59 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
304. Id. at 558.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 549, 558-59 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE, at 1
(Aug. 1994)).
307. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1285-86 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted
in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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dented in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and represents a line
that has never been crossed before."'
The absence of judicial precedent, however, does not make a law
unconstitutional, but the traditional presumption of constitutio-
nality accorded to all federal legislation is "arguably weakened,
and an 'absence of power' might reasonably be inferred where-as
here-'earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive
power."30 9 The court in Florida ex rel. Bondi held that by our fore-
fathers' design and past Supreme Court precedent, the Commerce
Clause regulates activity only.31° The court stated that "[i]t would
be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that the gov-
ernment could regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.'311
To hold that Congress could force a passive market nonparticipant
to buy a product from a private vendor would presuppose that the
bare act of compelling an individual to buy health insurance is
itself economic activity that substantially affects interstate com-
merce.312 Put another way, by requiring that all individuals obtain
health insurance, the government is actually creating the com-
merce it intends to regulate.313 If this regime is held to be consti-
tutionally permissible, the government could do virtually anything
it wanted. The court in Florida ex rel. Bondi stated that:
It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in
part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate.. . im-
posing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have
set out to create a government with the power to force people
to buy tea in the first place. If Congress can penalize a pas-
sive individual for failing to engage in commerce, the enume-
ration of powers in the Constitution would have been in vain
for it would be difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
308. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 559 (Sutton, J., concurring).
309. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1284-85 (quoting Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 905, 908 (1997)).
310. Id. at 1286-87 (citations omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1286.
313. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 568 (Graham, J., dissenting) (citations omit-
ted). See also Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648
F.3d 1235, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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power and we would have a Constitution in name only. Surely
this is not what the Founding Fathers could have intended. 14
From this opposing point of view, an individual's choice not to
buy health insurance is inactivity; thus, the individual mandate
regulates inactivity-the opposite of activity."5 But for the indi-
vidual mandate, these individuals are not part of the national
health insurance market. Since the Commerce Clause has, to
date, applied only to voluntary, self-initiated activity, court held
that the individual mandate is beyond its limits, and a person's
own decision not to buy health insurance is not the type of eco-
nomic activity properly subject to the commerce power.
Opponents state that Congress' authority has limits. The tools
at its disposal are restricted to those assigned by the Constitution,
and those methodologies cannot infringe on the Tenth Amendment
police powers traditionally reserved to the states or the people."6
To opponents, "Congress' exercise of power intrudes on both the
States and the people." 18 As expressed by Professor Randy Bar-
nett, one of the most prominent and published proponents of the
conservative position, the individual mandate turns citizens into
subjects and represents an impermissible commandeering of the
people. 8 ' Note that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
all of the above arguments in its August 2011 decision affirming
the Northern District of Florida's ruling that the individual
mandate is unconstitutional."9
Even if the individual mandate is an unprecedented exercise of
the commerce power, the novelty of the issue does not make it a
"bridge too far."32° The Sixth Circuit majority opined that this only
means that the Supreme Court will have considerable latitude in
deciding the controversy. 21 New public policy imperatives can
314. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
315. Id. at 1287.
316. Id. at 571 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X).
317. Id.
318. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insur-
ance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 637 (2010).
319. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub om. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
320. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
321. Id. at 559 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has considerable discretion in resolving this dis-
pute.").
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give rise to novel and creative, but nonetheless constitutional re-
medies under the aggregation principle and substantial effects
doctrine.322
The opposition remonstrates vociferously that the individual
mandate presents a mortal threat to our hallowed traditions of
federalism.323 Conservative opponents have penned learned dis-
quisitions relying on history, tradition, and the hallowed pages of
the Federalist Papers. The text of the Commerce Clause, howev-
er, makes no distinction between action and inaction and neither
has the Supreme Court to date.324 There is, in fact, no Constitu-
tional bar to passing legislation that could be said to regulate in-
activity.325 In its Commerce Clause cases, the Supreme Court has
declined to apply "flexible labels" to define the scope of the com-
merce power.326 Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause
has been defined by "broad principles of economic practicality"
32
and that authority cannot be confined by any decision making
formula based on labels such as direct, indirect, or in this case,
activity or inactivity.3 28 Furthermore, as pointed out in Mead:
It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who makes a
choice to forego health insurance is not "acting," especially
given the serious economic and health-related consequences
to every individual of that choice. Making a choice is an af-
firmative action, whether one decides to do something or not
322. Id. at 559.
323. Id. at 571-73 (Graham, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
324. Id. at 547 (majority opinion).
325. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 547.
326. Id. at 548 (citing United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2001)). In
Faasse, the court rejected a constitutional challenge to the Child Support Recovery Act of
1982, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). Id. The opponents of the Act argued that the legislation was
unconstitutional because it regulated the failure of a parent to make court ordered, out-of-
state child support payments-in other words, the legislation regulated the failure of a
person to place a thing in interstate commerce. Id. The Faasse court held that Congress
had a rational basis to conclude that a non-custodial parent's failure to send court ordered
payments across state lines substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. Referring to
Faasse in Thomas More Law Center, the court noted that "[flocusing on the broader eco-
nomic landscape of the legislation revealed the unworkability of relying on inexact labels..
. ." 651 F.3d at 548. The Thomas More Law Center court similarly declined to rely on prob-
lematic labels in analyzing the constitutionality of the individual mandate and held the
provision "constitutional notwithstanding the fact that it could be labeled as regulating
inactivity." Id.
327. Id. at 547 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
328. Id. at 547-48 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)).
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do something. They are two sides of the same coin. To pre-
tend otherwise is to ignore reality.9
A choice to buy or not to buy health insurance is not a question
of activity versus inactivity or passivity.3 The issue is not wheth-
er one buys or abstains from buying certain goods and services.
The real issue is about how a person will pay or who, in fact, will
pay for the health care services that people will inevitably con-
sume.331 The focus should be on the actual effects of the contested
conduct on interstate commerce. A "myopic focus on a malleable
label"-in this case action or inaction, uninsured or self-insured-
cannot resolve the constitutionality of the individual mandate.332
Notwithstanding the opposing arguments, the Constitutional
limits of the commerce power have been clearly set forth in Lopez
and Morrison, and the controlling test is the substantial effects
test.333 Congress can regulate economic activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, based on the rational basis conclu-
sions of its elected members. The individual mandate "regulates
activity that is commercial and economic in nature: economic and
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased."334 The fact that virtual-
ly no one can escape the need for health care explains why total
health-related spending in the United States added up to $2.5 tril-
lion in 2009, equivalent to 17.6% of the Gross Domestic Product,
335and amounting to an average expenditure of $8086 per person.
Health care delivery is clearly a national market substantially
affecting interstate commerce. 6 Consumers of health care have to
pay, and the costs can be staggering. The acts of paying for health
care, obtaining health care, and insuring for health care all ad-
329. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
330. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 37.
331. Id.
332. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 548.
333. Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (citations omitted). See also Thomas More, 651 F.3d at
554-55, 567 (citation omitted).
334. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(A),
124 Stat. 119, 907 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A) (2010)).
335. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2010 HIGHLIGHTS, available at
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf
336. 42 U.S.C § 18091(a)(2)(B). Drugs, medical supplies, and medical equipment all flow
through interstate commerce. Id. Most health insurers are multistate or large regional
corporations and thus premiums and claim payments travel across state lines. Id.
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dress the financial risk of insufficient funds in the face of sickness
or accident, and all these acts affect interstate commerce.
A person could reasonably anticipate the costs of routine medi-
cal expenses, but no one can predict the costs of catastrophic ill-
ness or accidental injury. To protect against and provide for medi-
cal costs, many Americans purchase health insurance. As dis-
cussed earlier, the other method of payment is self-insurance.
People can save money and conserve assets so that funds will be
available to cover their needs. For example, the plaintiffs in Tho-
mas More Law Center and Mead complained that the individual
mandate required them to alter their spending and saving ha-
bits."' It also forced some complainants to cut down on discretio-
nary spending for entertainment, recreation, and dining out.
Unfortunately, however, many citizens who self-insure will re-
serve nothing and rely on public charity, private gifts, and/or
EMTALA"9 The point to be made is that paying for health insur-
ance and self-insuring are two ways to address the same risk.
Each involves purposeful positive choices. Both choices comprise
action rather than inaction, and both affect the interstate markets
in health insurance and health care.34° A person can keep suffi-
cient funds in his bank account to write periodic premium checks.
Alternatively, one can prudently manage assets over time so that
adequate funds will be available to cover any and all health-care
contingencies. Either way, Congress reasonably concluded that
the decisions and actions of the self-insured were "quintessentially
economic"34' and substantially affected interstate commerce.
Roscoe Filburn chose to "self-insure" by growing his own wheat
on his own farm to cover his own personal needs.342 By so doing,
he could avoid buying wheat on the open market.343 Similarly, the
ACA opponents, by reserving or "growing" their own funds, plan to
pay their medical costs out of pocket to avoid buying health insur-
ance from the commercial marketplace. The ACA opponents
pointed out that Filburn had already been in the agricultural
337. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 536; Mead, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
338. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 561.
339. Id. at 548-49, 557 (Sutton, J., concurring). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2010).
340. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 544-45 (citation omitted).
341. Id. at 557-58 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).





business at the time his case was decided, 344 but everyone is by
definition in the health care market-knowingly or unknowingly,
willingly or unwillingly, by choice or due to exigency. No one can
avoid it. The uninsured that consider themselves non-participants
have in reality self-insured, and all members of that class are sub-
ject to regulation, even those who have sufficient assets to cover
all their medical needs. Congress can regulate all who self-insure,
whether or not they can pay for medical care. Put another way,
even if there are individuals among the class of the uninsured
with sufficient means to cover any or all the health care they may
require, "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class
is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances of that class." '345
B. If Congress Can Make You Buy Health Insurance, Congress
Can Make You Eat Broccoli: The Slippery Slope Argument
3 46
The district court in Florida ex rel. Bondi attacked the govern-
ment's rationale that the health care market is unique and asked
why the purported factors that make it unique are constitutionally
significant. 47 The government argued that the health care deli-
very market is unique, because several factors cause everyone to
be active market participants, and no individual is really inac-
tive.34' First, everyone is susceptible to sudden and unanticipated
illness.349 Everyone will require health care at some point during
their lives, and no one can predict the costs. 3 0 Second, no one can
opt out of the health care market. 31' Third, EMTALA requires
hospitals to provide care to all in need, regardless of ability to
344. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778-79, 780
(E.D. Va. 2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas
More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 558 (Sutton, J., concurring); Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v.
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
345. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
346. Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1825, 1839 (2011) (internal citations omitted). See also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1289 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part
and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
347. Id. at 1288-89.
348. Id. at 1288.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
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pay.3 2 Finally, the massive aggregated costs of unpaid medical
care are passed on to everyone through the cost-shifting pheno-
menon discussed earlier.353
In Florida ex rel. Bondi, the district court opined that none of
the above features are constitutionally relevant.354 None of these
uniqueness factors establish that the uninsured are active partici-
pants in the national health care market, and thereby, subject to
the Commerce power. 5 None of these factors make the individual
mandate constitutional.356 The Eleventh Circuit, in affirming the
district court, emphasized that the commerce power is not unli-
mited and that the Supreme Court set boundaries to that enume-
rated power in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morri-
son.3 1' The uniqueness factors that the government proposed de-
scribe the complexity of the health insurance and health care
markets, but those elements have nothing to do with any limiting
principles grounded in settled Commerce Clause precedent.3 5 1 If
Congress enacts a law that "exceeds its enumerated powers, then
[that law] is unconstitutional, regardless of the purported unique-
ness of the context in which it is being asserted."355 Every market
problem could be viewed as unique in some particular aspects.36°
Besides health care, the court noted that there are other mar-
kets that people cannot opt out of.361 Using the food market as an
example, the court stated that "Congress could require that people
buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only because
the required purchases will positively impact interstate commerce,
but also because people who eat healthier tend to be healthier and
are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the health
care system."362 Similarly, because no one can avoid the transpor-
tation market, Congress could require people above a specified
352. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky
v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1295:96 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom.
Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
353. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
354. Id. at 1291.
355. Id. at 1292.
356. Id. at 1290-91.
357. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1296 (citations omitted).
358. Id. at 1295-96.
359. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1289.
362. Id.
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income level to buy General Motors ("GM") cars.363 This could be
done under the rationale that those who refuse to buy GM cars or
those who buy foreign cars are adversely impacting the U.S. auto
industry, and thereby, interstate commerce, and that conduct ad-
versely affects a company that was bailed out by the government,
and ultimately, by taxpayers.364 Additionally, no one can opt out of
the housing market and most people at some time will buy a
home.36 Widespread defaults on home mortgages result in aggre-
gate cost-shifting with significant and demonstrated effects on the
housing, lending, and securities markets nationwide.366 Could
Congress, therefore, require people to buy homes and mandate
that they finance their purchases with mortgages, and could Con-
gress compel these homebuyers to buy mortgage cancellation in-
surance to backstop their debt?6 7 Could Congress enact a statute
of this magnitude to stabilize the housing market?6
Unlike the national health care market, however, no produce
purveyors are compelled to supply broccoli for free, no GM manu-
facturers or retailers are required to give away cars, and no mort-
gage lender is required by law to issue mortgages to applicants
with no credit. This is true notwithstanding the fact that suppli-
cants may come through the doors of the supermarket in need of
green vegetables, others may arrive at the showroom doors in
need of cars for transportation, and still others may enter the
bank in need of money for housing. Furthermore, people can
clearly choose to live without broccoli, cars, and even tea (to go
back to Judge Vinson's Boston tea party metaphor).9 Also, people
can rent rather than own homes. Health care is not broccoli. As
noted by William Huhn, "[i]t is disingenuous to equate the re-
quirement to maintain health insurance (which is part of a com-
prehensive regulation of the health insurance industry) with laws
that tell people specifically where to live and what to eat."'"
These differences establish discernible limits on Congressional
363. Id.
364. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
365. Id. at 1290.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1289.
369. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
370. Wendy K. Mariner et al., Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli? And Why That's a
Hard Question, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 202 (2011).
371. Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 32 J.L. MED.139, 157-58
(2011).
Duquesne Law Review
power. There are due process limitations on the power of every
American legislative body,372 and there are political restraints and
consequences that would present a decided disincentive for law-
makers to pass absurd or abusive legislation.373 Nevertheless, the
district court in Florida ex rel. Bondi feared that under Congress'
reasoning in this case there would be no logical limit on the com-
merce power,374 and the Eleventh Circuit agreed.' The Eleventh
Circuit stated that "the [Constitution] protects against the Gov-
ernment .... We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly."
' 7 6
Furthermore, a concurring judge in Thomas More Law Center
stated that "[t]he uniqueness that justifies one exercise of power
becomes precedent for the next .... , Congress cannot exceed its
constitutional authority, notwithstanding the uniqueness or ex-
igency of the problem it seeks to remedy, and "no matter how po-
werful the federal interest involved.
378
Not every Supreme Court decision, however, necessarily estab-
lishes precedent for others. The effects of decisions can be limited
to the context of the case at bar. Bush v. Gore3 79 has not been
cited to support the proposition that the Supreme Court can de-
cide disputed elections and pick the President of the United
States.38 ° Chief Justice Roberts, in United States v. Stevens,38 l re-
ferred to the First Amendment case New York v. Ferber,3 8 ' and
held that the decision in Ferber "was a special case"-limited to
the context of live child pornography. 383 The point was that the
372. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
373. Hall, supra note 346, at 1825, 1864-66, 1867-71 (internal citation omitted). Florida
ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289 n.20.
374. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286, 1290-91, 1293-94.
375. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
376. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1289 n.20 (alteration in original) (citing,
inter alia, United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (refusing to recognize commer-
cial videos and other depictions of extreme animal cruelty as a newly minted category of
constitutionally unprotected speech outside the umbrella of the First Amendment)).
377. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 572 (6th Cir. 2011) (Graham, J.,
concurring).
378. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1312 (citation omitted).
379. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
380. Mariner et al., supra note 270, at 202.
381. 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1577 (2010).
382. 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a New York statute that declared live child porno-
graphy to be a new category of banned speech, unprotected by the First Amendment).
383. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (citations omitted).
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reasoning behind one decision did not necessarily open the door
for Congress to invent new and future categories of forbidden
speech. The holding in one special case did not amount to carte
blanche for Congress to infringe the First Amendment free speech
rights of the American people.8 4 Similarly, the unique circums-
tances that justify the ACA need not invariably become precedent
for unlimited Congressional authority. As Judge Marcus wrote for
the Eleventh Circuit in his dissent in Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen-
eral v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services:
[T]his case does not open the floodgates to an unbounded
Commerce Clause power because the particular factual cir-
cumstances are truly unique and not susceptible to replication
elsewhere. The factual uniqueness would render any holding
in this case limited. I add the unremarkable observation that
the holding of every case is bounded by the particular fact
patterns arising therein."5
In this case, the distinctive attributes of the national health
care delivery market are constitutionally significant, because
those features do in fact bring every American into the national
health care market, and thereby, provide the jurisdictional nexus
with interstate commerce and the limits on the commerce power
that were lacking in the acts struck down in Lopez and Morri-
386son.
V. POLITICS: THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
ORIGINATED FROM REPUBLICAN POLICYMAKERS
Congress has the power to enact a single-payer, socialized
health insurance system under its tax and welfare power."'
Through that power and by means of payroll deductions, all work-
ing Americans purchase government mandated retirement and
disability insurance in the form of social security 3 1, and they
384. Id.
385. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1356 (1lth Cir. 2011) (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S.
Ct. 604 (2011).
386. See supra Parts II and III.A.
387. Hall, supra note 347, at 1826 (internal citations omitted).
388. Id. 1826 n.3 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (upholding the




finance health insurance for seniors by means of Medicare taxes. 9
Congress could have raised income tax rates or enacted a payroll
tax to pay for health benefits. Congress could have enacted Medi-
care for all, but instead passed the ACA, which is far more protec-
tive of insurance markets and individual freedoms than any cen-
tralized government monopoly."'
As Republican appointee Judge Hudson, in striking down the
individual mandate, wrote in Cuccinelli, "[this] case has a distinc-
tive political undercurrent."39' Actually, Republican policymakers
first proposed the idea of an individual mandate in 1993, as part
of a health reform bill they introduced during the Clinton Admin-
istration.392 At that time, conservatives supported the mandate,
because it called for individual responsibility to counter the "free
rider effect" of those who consumed medical care without paying.3
The goal, with bipartisan support, was to preserve the health in-
surance market and at the same time achieve universal coverage,
and the provisions were very similar to the ACA today.394 Before
the advent of the ACA or "Obamacare," Republican lawmakers
never questioned the constitutionality of an individual mandate.'
In 2006, former Republican governor Mitt Romney signed into
law the landmark Massachusetts health care reform bill-An Act
Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, and Accountable Health
Care. The Massachusetts Act was the product of a remarkable
collaboration of multiple public and private interest groups, a
Democratic state legislature, and a Republican governor. 7  Like
389. See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen., 648 F.3d at 1302-03. See also Mariner et al.,
supra note 370, at 202.
390. Hall, supra note 347, at 1826 (internal citation omitted). See also Koppelman,
supra note 30, at *4.
391. Wendy Mariner & George J. Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1300, 1300 (2010) (citing Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sibelius, 702 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010) (denying the government's motion to dismiss, holding that the
Commonwealth of Virginia had standing to challenge the individual mandate, and staying
resolution of the controlling issue, pending hearing on the merits), vacated and remanded
for dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011)).
392. Hall, supra note 347, at 1826 n.5 (citing Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-
Favored Health Mandate, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 15, 2010),
http:lwww.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123670612).
393. Rovner, supra note 392.
394. Id.
395. Hall, supra note 347, at 1826 (internal citations omitted).
396. Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andrds Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachu-
setts: Setting the Standard for National Reform, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 410 (2008)





the ACA, the law expanded Medicaid coverage, created state sub-
sidized health insurance for low income persons not eligible for
Medicaid, merged the individual and small group health insurance
markets, instituted a "fair share" assessment against employers,
instituted an individual mandate, and created an insurance ex-
change that was empowered to set standards for coverage and af-
fordability.398 The bill provided state subsidies for those who could
not afford the costs.
399
Prior to signing the bill, then Governor Romney made this
comment, focusing particularly on the requirement that every citi-
zen of Massachusetts have health insurance:
Around the country, people are watching because they know
this is big. Some on the far left don't like it because it's not a
single-payer universal coverage program. Some on the far
right don't like it because they don't like government telling
people that they need to get insurance. But the great majori-
ty of people, both on the left and the right, believe that this is
a step forward. °
The Governor explicitly acknowledged the cost-shifting effect of
uncompensated medical care, pointing out that with everyone cov-
ered, the burden of the uninsured would no longer be passed on to
the community.' Governor Romney characterized the Massachu-
setts plan as "something that's much closer to Republican ideals:
reform the market to make the health-insurance marketplace




The Massachusetts plan was a success and showed that health
reform could work.0  Massachusetts achieved its goal of near uni-
versal coverage with 98% of its citizens insured in 2010.4  The
reforms cost the state slightly over 1% of the total state budget for
398. Joel Weissman & JudyAnn Bigby, Massachusetts Health Care Reform-Near-
Universal Coverage at What Cost?, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2012 (2009).
399. Amitabh Chandra et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate-Evidence from
Massachusetts, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 294-95 (2011).
400. Richard Knox & Vikki Valentine, Q & A: Gov. Romney Universal Health Care,
NAT'L PUB RADIO (Apr. 8, 2006), http://www.npr.orgltemplates/story/story.php?storyld=
5330792.
401. Id.
402. Id. (comparing the Massachusetts plan with the unsuccessful health care campaign
of the Clinton administration).





fiscal year 20 10.45 The average premiums for citizens who pur-
chased unsubsidized care dropped 20-40%, mostly because the
plan brought younger and healthier people into the pool to offset
the costs of the older and sicker population."' Most polls have
shown that the Massachusetts reforms are strongly supported by
the general citizenry, business leaders, and physicians.4"7
The Massachusetts plan, however, has not been perfect and has
not curbed the relentless rise in health care costs. Massachusetts
did not address the cost problem until universal health insurance
coverage had been accomplished."0 The challenge is considerable
and cannot be minimized. Serious remedial efforts are currently
under consideration: increasing the state's power to reject pre-
mium increases, limiting reimbursements to hospitals and provid-
ers, and promoting new, innovative alternatives to traditional,
costly fee-for-service medicine.4 09  The ACA will probably evolve in
a similar way, but the current ACA does contain provisions to rein
in Medicare and Medicaid spending, and by example, the rest of
the health care system."'
Today, 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney
has had to change course by distancing himself from "Romney-
care," the Massachusetts reform act he formerly touted and proud-
ly signed into law. Earlier this year Governor Romney told ABC
anchor George Stephanopoulos, that Obamacare was "a very bad
piece of legislation."4 ' Governor Romney was applauding the dis-
trict court's decision in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services412 (ruling the ACA to be unconstitution-
al) and quoted the court's memorable tea party remark-that the
Boston tea party patriots would never have countenanced a gov-




408. Editorial, supra note 408.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. George Stephanopoulos, Mitt Romney: No Apology for Individual Health Care
Mandate, NBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2011, http://blogs.abcnews.com/George/2011O02/mitt-romney-
no-apology-for-individual-health-care-mandate.html (internal citation omitted).
412. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1298-99 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. At-
torney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
413. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (citation omitted).
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However, Governor Romney evidently had no problem with Mas-
sachusetts imposing an individual mandate.
States' rights activists and other opponents of the ACA argue
that by our founding fathers' design, the power to regulate health
care and health insurance belongs primarily and exclusively to the
states.414 Under basic principles of federalism, 1 ' the states have
the constitutional prerogative to enact and experiment with their
own solutions for their citizens' health care, and states can exer-
cise that power through an individual mandate. 16 But a state
enacted individual mandate necessarily draws those affected into
the health care market, and once in that market under state regu-
lation, the federal government can regulate further under the
commerce power-e.g., "by increasing the minimum coverage al-
ready required by state law or by requiring them to comply with
other components of the Affordable Care Act."417 Nevertheless,
Governor Romney made clear that the bipartisanship in Massa-
chusetts was obviously an aberration, because "[almong Republi-
cans in Washington, pro-mandate arguments .. . gave way to con-
cerns over individual liberty and the political priority of handing
the Obama administration a defeat."
418
As expressed by Professor Mark Hall, the constitutional chal-
lenges to the ACA have been primarily motivated by libertarian
outrage against the constitutional reality that the federal govern-
ment can force private individuals to buy health insurance-
purely as a civic obligation 1 ' or "as a condition of lawful residence
in the United States."42 ° Similarly, as expressed by Judge Hudson
for the Eastern District of Virginia, "[alt its core, this dispute is
414. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring).
415. Basic to the tenets of Federalism are the words of James Madison:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous
and indefinite .... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the
objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and prop-
erties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 333 (James Madison) (Johnson ed., 2004).
416. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 562.
417. Id.
418. Jonathan Oberlander, Under Siege-The Individual Mandate for Health Insurance
and Its Alternatives, 364 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1085 (2011).
419. Mark A. Hall, Individual Versus State Constitutional Rights Under Health Care
Reform, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1233, 1234 (2011).
420. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 558-59 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing, inter
alia, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MEMORANDUM: THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF AN
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE TO BUY HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (1994)).
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not simply about regulating the business of insurance-or crafting
a scheme of universal health insurance coverage-it's about an
individual's right to choose to participate,4 21 or put differently, "an
individual's right to choose to be uninsured."22
The Supreme Court prescribed explicit limits on the commerce
power in Lopez and Morrison,42 and those boundaries were
enacted to protect the states' police powers against unconstitu-
tional usurpation by the federal government. The constitutional
attacks on the individual mandate, however, have generally been
driven by the libertarian premise that the mandate infringes the
personal rights of "[w]e the People."424 Nevertheless, there is, in
fact, no constitutional basis for an individual to claim a personal
liberty interest in refusing to buy health insurance. Though no
person can be forced to accept medical care against his will, (be-
cause people have that fundamental right),42" ' "there is no constitu-
tionally protected individual right to be left entirely alone by the
government," and people have no protected individual right to
save or spend money entirely as they please."426 Although the ACA
is about health care, "all that is at stake is money. No one is
forced to receive medical care, only to pay insurance premiums."27
In terms of Tenth Amendment infringements on states' rights,
Judge Moon in Liberty University428 summarized the current state
of Tenth Amendment429 jurisprudence:
The amendment is violated if (1) Congress does not have au-
thority under the Constitution to pass the regulation, or (2)
421. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(ruling the individual mandate unconstitutional), vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656
F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). "The unchecked expansion of congressional power to the limits
suggested by the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision would invite unbridled exercise of
federal police powers." Id.
422. Hall, supra note 347, at 1838 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788) (internal quotation marks omitted).
423. Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 31-32 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom. Seven-Sky
v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). See also Thomas More Law Ctr.,
651 F.3d at 542, 544-45.
424. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
425. Hall, supra note 419, at 1236 (internal citation omitted).
426. Hall, supra note 347, at 1838 (internal citation omitted).
427. Hall, supra note 419, at 1235.
428. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 636 (W.D. Va. 2010) (internal
citations omitted), vacated and remanded for dismissal, No. 10-2347, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
18618 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
429. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the




the means of regulation employed impermissibly infringe on
state sovereignty by undercutting and displacing state au-
thority and by commandeering state legislative functions.43 °
The ACA is a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, and,
where Congress legitimately exercises its Constitutional authori-
ty, there is no reservation of that power to the states. Further,
South-Eastern Underwriters13' established that Congress has the
constitutional power to regulate the insurance industry, and the
government already regulates health insurance and health care
under long established dual sovereignty federal programs, such as
Medicare,432 the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA), 33 the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1985 ("COBRA"), 34 and the Health Insurance Portabili-
ty and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPPA")
435
The ACA neither infringes state sovereignty nor commandeers
state governments. Although the ACA directs states to create
health benefit exchanges,436 the states actually have options;
States may adopt the federal standard for health benefit ex-
changes or pass their own legislation to create exchanges that sa-
tisfy the federal standards.437 If state lawmakers elect not to
comply, then the federal government will set up and operate the
in-state exchanges as a default measure.4 8 This can be done ac-
cording to Congress' "power to offer states the choice of regulating
private activity according to federal standards or having state law
pre-empted by federal regulation.'" 9 The ACA does not compel
state officials to carry out the federal regulatory regime, because
430. Liberty Univ., Inc.,753 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (citations omitted).
431. Id. (citing United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944)).
432. Id. at 637 n.15 (citing Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L.
No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, and 45
U.S.C.).
433. Id. (citing Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2009)) (establishing federal standard
requirements for health insurance plans offered by private employers)).
434. Id. (citing Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300bb to 300bb-8 (2003)) (enabling workers who
lose their employer sponsored health insurance to continue their coverage for a specified
time period)).
435. Liberty Univ., Inc., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 637 n.15 (citing Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (directly regulates private health insurance plans)).






the individual mandate and its operative compliance mechan-
ism-the shared responsibility payment penalty-acts directly
upon every American.44°
States' rights arguments have also been raised against the Me-
dicaid expansion provisions. Medicaid is a federal program that
provides health care for the medically indigent.442 The program is
funded jointly by the federal government and the state.443 The
ACA requires states to increase Medicaid spending, but the feder-
al government will pay the increased costs for the first three years
and then reduce its payments to 90% by 2020.44' No states, how-
ever, are compelled to participate in Medicaid, and states are free
to withdraw from the program. 445 Therefore, the Medicaid expan-
sion does not commandeer the states. The program does not
"make states mere agents of federal authority rather than sove-
reign governments."446 Note, however, that these comments are, at
best, a sketch of the federalist or statist attacks on the ACA and
the government's rebuttals. Professor Hall provided a full analy-
sis in the article cited above. 47
Nevertheless, it needs to be re-emphasized that the gravamen of
all of the attacks on the ACA has been the constitutionality of the
individual mandate, and whether the mandate exceeds the au-
thority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Regarding
states' rights and individual rights under the commerce power:
The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there
is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall
prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power over
commerce is superior to that of the States to provide for the
welfare or necessities of their inhabitants . . . Just as state
acquiescence to federal regulation cannot expand the bounds
440. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sibelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 772-73, 774 (E.D. Va.
2010), vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011). See also, Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 571-72 (Graham, J., dissenting); Randy E. Barnett,
Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 62
MERCER L. REv. 605, 617 (2011).
441. Hall, supra note 419, at 1237-42.
442. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
443. Id.
444. Hall, supra note 419, at 1240-41.
445. Id. at 1239.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 1233 (internal citation omitted). See also Hall, supra note 34, at 481-85.
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of the Commerce Clause, so too state action cannot circum-
scribe Congress' plenary commerce power.448
Further, as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals noted in its No-
vember decision in Seven-Sky v. Holder: "[tihe right to be free
from federal regulation is not absolute, and yields to the impera-
tive that Congress be free to forge national solutions to national
problems, no matter how local--or seemingly passive-their indi-
vidual origins.""9 The national health insurance and health care
market is not a local problem. Health security is a national prob-
45'0lem, and a national problem requires a national solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ACA is the product of a Democratic Congress and a Demo-
cratic president, and the Act represents the defining domestic pro-
gram of the Obama administration.45' Seldom has a law of this
magnitude passed with zero bipartisan support, and seldom has
an act of Congress faced the intensity of the all-out war of attrition
launched by a determined libertarian and federalist opposition.452
Rarely has a piece of legislation been as widely misrepresented,
misunderstood, and vilified as the ACA .4 " Ex-Governor of Alaska,
Sarah Palin, claimed that the cost containment provisions would
result in the creation of government death panels.454 Claims have
been made that the ACA funds abortions. Others assert that the
ACA is a government takeover of health care and represents the
advent of socialized medicine in this country.455
448. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (referring to U.S. CONST. art. Vl, cl. 2).
449. 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258-59 (1964)).
450. Koppelman, supra note 30, at *14, 16, 23. See also President Barack Obama & Vice
President Joseph Biden, supra note 276.
Today the American people have greater health security than they did a year ago...
• Americans deserve the freedom and security of knowing that insurance companies
can't deny, cap, or drop their coverage when they need it most, while taking meaning-
ful steps to curb runaway health care costs.
Id.
451. Bondurant, supra note 49, at 249-50; Hall, supra note 34, at 457-58 (internal cita-
tions omitted).
452. Bacon, supra note 9, at 1-2.
453. Hall, supra note 34, at 457-58 (internal citation omitted).
454. Id. (internal citation omitted).
455. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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The arguments against the ACA have been summarized in Part
III, supra,456 all of which are primarily focused on the individual
mandate. The chief complaint is that the minimum essential cov-
erage requirement exceeds the authority of congress under its
commerce power and is, therefore, unconstitutional and legally
dead ab initio.457 The mandate regulates passive citizens who are
uninsured and requires them to purchase health insurance on the
private market-a commodity they do not want. 5 ' The opponents
argue passionately that citizens have the right to be uninsured
and that the status of being uninsured does not comprise economic
or noneconomic activity that in the aggregate affects interstate
commerce.4 " The opponents insist that the status of being unin-
sured does not comprise activity properly subject to the commerce
power, and they reject the government's argument that the unin-
sured, in fact, have taken affirmative economic steps by self-
insuring."'
The modern day constitutional requirements for congressional
action under the Commerce Clause were set forth earlier under
the three-part analysis in Mead v. Holder.461' The ACA passes all
three prongs of the test: (1) not buying health insurance is in fact
the economic act of self-insuring; (2) Congress had a rational basis
to conclude that the aggregated economic conduct of foregoing
health insurance or self-insuring substantially affects the national
health care delivery market; (3) the individual mandate is critical
to the success of the ACA, and absent the minimum essential cov-
erage requirement, the goal of near universal health insurance
coverage and affordable health care for all Americans would be
unattainable. 462 Expressed differently, the individual mandate is a
456. See supra Part III.
457. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sibelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Va. 2010),
vacated and remanded for dismissal, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011).
458. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 564-
65 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring).
459. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1291 (N.D. Fla. 2011), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen.
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted
in part sub nom. Florida v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
460. Florida ex rel. Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1287-88, 1292-95; Virginia ex rel. Cuc-
cinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 775-76, 778-79, 781-82.
461. 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D.D.C. 2011), affd sub nom, Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
462. Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 546-47; 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(H) to 18091(J)
(2010); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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necessary and proper "means for carrying into execution .. .the
Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the Unit-
ed States.'63
Finally, "In]ot every intrusive law is an unconstitutionally in-
trusive law. And even the most powerful intuition about the
meaning of the Constitution must be matched with a textual and
enforceable theory of constitutional limits, and the activi-
ty/inactivity dichotomy does not work with respect to health in-
surance . ,,464 The Constitution is a document "intended to en-
dure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the vari-
ous crises of human affairs.1 6' Though the individual mandate is
an unforseen application of the commerce power, "[i]t would have
been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for ex-
igencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and
which can be best provided for as they occur."466 If the Supreme
Court adheres to modern day Commerce Clause jurisprudence and
decides the case based on precedent rather than partisan poli-
tics,4 7 the ACA should be upheld. Were the Court to decide oth-
erwise, it would represent an atavistic return to the libertarian
and statist Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the times of the
Founding Fathers that pre-dated Jones & Laughlin Steel in 1937
and Wickard v. Filburn in 1942.468 Nevertheless, the right wing
political movements that idealize those years gone by are formida-
ble and their "Astroturf" effects,469 grass roots appeal, and poten-
tial judicial impact cannot be underestimated 470
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